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<topic ID="655" x="-440" y="440" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Freud: The 'unconscious' is]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The 'unconscious' is different from the 'preconscious' (some memories, facts, etc.) which can become conscious.<br /><br />Sigmund Freud]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="684" x="-460" y="460" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Husserl: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Edmund Husserl<br /><br />Edmund Husserl]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="685" x="-480" y="480" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Husserl: The one thing that e]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The one thing that exists for sure is our consciousness, we should start from there to build our picture of reality.<br /><br />Edmund Husserl]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="686" x="-500" y="500" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Husserl: My awareness is of o]]></label><detail><![CDATA[My awareness is of objects -- not of myself having experiences of objects.<br /><br />Edmund Husserl]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="687" x="-520" y="520" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Husserl: We should put aside ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[We should put aside the questions about the independent existence of the objects that we perceive and investigate them as objects of consciousness.<br /><br />Edmund Husserl]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="779" x="-540" y="540" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Russell: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Bertrand Russell<br /><br />Bertrand Russell]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="795" x="-560" y="560" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Russell: The sensation we hav]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The sensation we have when we see a patch of color simply is that patch of colour; and since sensations are not intentional, they are non-mental.<br /><br />Bertrand Russell]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="807" x="-580" y="580" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Wittgenstein: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Ludwig Wittgenstein<br /><br />Ludwig Wittgenstein]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="817" x="-600" y="600" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Wittgenstein: I have insufficient ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[I have insufficient distance with my sensations to doubt them, so talk of knowledge about sensations makes no sense.<br /><br />Ludwig Wittgenstein]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="818" x="-620" y="620" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Wittgenstein: Our talk of sensatio]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Our talk of sensations and other mental states is expressive, not descriptive.<br /><br />Ludwig Wittgenstein]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="899" x="-640" y="640" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Popper: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Karl Popper<br /><br />Karl Popper]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="908" x="-660" y="660" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Popper: New ideas and free-w]]></label><detail><![CDATA[New ideas and free-will decisions may be the result of selections from repertoires of random events, like natural selection and genetic mutations.<br /><br />Karl Popper]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="912" x="-680" y="680" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ryle: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Gilbert Ryle<br /><br />Gilbert Ryle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="914" x="-700" y="700" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ryle: Materialist mechanis]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Materialist mechanism cannot by itself explain mental phenomena; human affairs need explanations of different kinds and levels.<br /><br />Gilbert Ryle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="915" x="-720" y="720" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ryle: Cartesian dualism (']]></label><detail><![CDATA[Cartesian dualism ('ghost in the machine') is a category mistake: it represents mental life as belonging to the wrong logical type or category.<br /><br />Gilbert Ryle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="916" x="-740" y="740" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ryle: Our talk of "the min]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Our talk of "the mind" does not require the existence of a private space which mental acts and happenings take place.<br /><br />Gilbert Ryle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="917" x="-760" y="760" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ryle: Having a mind is a m]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Having a mind is a matter of possessing abilities (knowing how to do things), dispositions, inclinations (emotions).<br /><br />Gilbert Ryle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="918" x="-780" y="780" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ryle: When we perceive or ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[When we perceive or have sensations, we are attending to features of the world or of our bodies, not to our experiences.<br /><br />Gilbert Ryle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="919" x="-800" y="800" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ryle: If our experiences h]]></label><detail><![CDATA[If our experiences have to be attended by us, that awareness experience also has to be attended -- this sets off an absurd regress.<br /><br />Gilbert Ryle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="920" x="-820" y="820" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ryle: We can choose to att]]></label><detail><![CDATA[We can choose to attend to the experiences of perception/ sensation, but it will be retrospective and fallible.<br /><br />Gilbert Ryle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="921" x="-840" y="840" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ryle: Our first-person sta]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Our first-person statements about intentions and decisions are 'avowals' and not descriptions of our mental states.<br /><br />Gilbert Ryle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="922" x="-860" y="860" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ryle: The self is elusive;]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The self is elusive; when we try to attend to ourselves, we put ourselves beyond our reach.<br /><br />Gilbert Ryle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1015" x="-880" y="880" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ayer: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Alfred Jules Ayer<br /><br />Alfred Jules Ayer]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1027" x="-900" y="900" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ayer: The substantive ego ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The substantive ego is a fictitious metaphysical entity; to say anything about the self is always to say something about sense-experiences.<br /><br />Alfred Jules Ayer]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1028" x="-920" y="920" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ayer: If I know that an ob]]></label><detail><![CDATA[If I know that an object behaves in every way as a conscious being must, by definition, behave, then I know that it is really conscious.<br /><br />Alfred Jules Ayer]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1032" x="-940" y="940" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ayer: 'Basic propositions']]></label><detail><![CDATA['Basic propositions' that refer solely to the content of a single experience can be verified conclusively by the occurrence of that experience.<br /><br />Alfred Jules Ayer]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1049" x="-960" y="960" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Goodman: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Nelson Goodman<br /><br />Nelson Goodman]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1050" x="-980" y="980" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Goodman: Judgements about qua]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Judgements about qualia are decrees; which ones are accepted is a matter of the overall coherence of my system of beliefs and my other qualia judgements.<br /><br />Nelson Goodman]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1106" x="-1000" y="1000" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Sellars: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Wilfried Sellars<br /><br />Wilfried Sellars]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1112" x="-1020" y="1020" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Sellars: Our concepts of sens]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Our concepts of sensory states and psychological states (hope, regret, desire, etc.) are like theoretical concepts in the sciences.<br /><br />Wilfried Sellars]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1113" x="-1040" y="1040" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Sellars: We can use the analo]]></label><detail><![CDATA[We can use the analogy of brain states as sentence-like structures and translate them into our own language to assess them rationally.<br /><br />Wilfried Sellars]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1161" x="-1060" y="1060" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Geach: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Peter Geach<br /><br />Peter Geach]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1169" x="-1080" y="1080" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Geach: The intentional mode]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The intentional modes of description needed for human activities are logically not derivable from natural science.<br /><br />Peter Geach]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1170" x="-1100" y="1100" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Geach: Humans have distinct]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Humans have distinctive mental capacities (e.g. rationality) that cannot be explained by Darwinian processes; they are miraculously created.<br /><br />Peter Geach]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1171" x="-1120" y="1120" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Geach: Materialists ("We th]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Materialists ("We think with the brain") and immaterialists ("We think with some non bodily part") are both wrong: there is no such thing as an organ of thought.<br /><br />Peter Geach]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1197" x="-1140" y="1140" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Davidson: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Donald Davidson<br /><br />Donald Davidson]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1208" x="-1160" y="1160" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Davidson: At least some mental]]></label><detail><![CDATA[At least some mental events interact causally with physical events.<br /><br />Donald Davidson]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1210" x="-1180" y="1180" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Davidson: Mental concepts, ins]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Mental concepts, insofar as they involve propositional attitudes partly identified by their logical relations, are normative; physical concepts are not.<br /><br />Donald Davidson]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1211" x="-1200" y="1200" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Davidson: Mental entities are ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Mental entities are neither definitionally nor nomologically reducible to the vocabulary of physics; there are no strict ('homonomic') psychological laws.<br /><br />Donald Davidson]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1213" x="-1220" y="1220" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Davidson: Mental events (taken]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Mental events (taken as unrepeatable, dated individuals) are identical with physical events.<br /><br />Donald Davidson]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1214" x="-1240" y="1240" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Davidson: Reasons and actions ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Reasons and actions are in causal relationships in their physical states, but these relationships cannot be subsumed under law.<br /><br />Donald Davidson]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1218" x="-1260" y="1260" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Smart: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- John Jamieson Carswell Smart<br /><br />John Jamieson Carswell Smart]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1222" x="-1280" y="1280" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Smart: States and processes]]></label><detail><![CDATA[States and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain.<br /><br />John Jamieson Carswell Smart]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1223" x="-1300" y="1300" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Smart: The apparent feature]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The apparent features of experience are not genuine properties "in the mind" or "in the world" but only the contents of mental representations.<br /><br />John Jamieson Carswell Smart]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1235" x="-1320" y="1320" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Mackie: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- John Mackie<br /><br />John Mackie]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1249" x="-1340" y="1340" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Mackie: The idea of a non-em]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The idea of a non-empirical free self that is not caused by one's character, desires, etc. is incoherent; we shouldn't base our concept of freedom on it.<br /><br />John Mackie]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1250" x="-1360" y="1360" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Mackie: An agent is responsi]]></label><detail><![CDATA[An agent is responsible for all and only their intentional action; even if determinism holds, the moral principles will still have their points.<br /><br />John Mackie]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1412" x="-1380" y="1380" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Putnam: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Hilary Putnam<br /><br />Hilary Putnam]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1425" x="-1400" y="1400" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Putnam: We cannot be brains ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[We cannot be brains in vats being deceived by mad scientists, because we can think of brains in vats.<br /><br />Hilary Putnam]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1426" x="-1420" y="1420" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Putnam: Mental states are no]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Mental states are not identical to physical states because a mental state can be realized by multiple physical states (in different organisms).<br /><br />Hilary Putnam]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1427" x="-1440" y="1440" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Putnam: Mental states are co]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Mental states are computational states, not identified by their physical realizations but by their functional roles.<br /><br />Hilary Putnam]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1432" x="-1460" y="1460" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chomsky: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Noam Chomsky<br /><br />Noam Chomsky]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1436" x="-1480" y="1480" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chomsky: The mind is a comput]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The mind is a computational network of innate, automatic, independent modules (e.g. language) interacting to yield perception, cognition, and thoughts.<br /><br />Noam Chomsky]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1465" x="-1500" y="1500" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Frankfurt: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Harry Frankfurt<br /><br />Harry Frankfurt]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1467" x="-1520" y="1520" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Frankfurt: An agent is free whe]]></label><detail><![CDATA[An agent is free when her 'first-order' intentions causing action are in harmony with her reflective 'second-order' intentions.<br /><br />Harry Frankfurt]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1523" x="-1540" y="1540" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Searle: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- John Searle<br /><br />John Searle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1526" x="-1560" y="1560" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Searle: Mental states are in]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Mental states are intrinsic and irreducible features of certain very complex kind of biological systems.<br /><br />John Searle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1527" x="-1580" y="1580" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Searle: Unless a mental stat]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Unless a mental state has the potential to be conscious, it does not qualify as genuinely mental.<br /><br />John Searle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1528" x="-1600" y="1600" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Searle: Real understanding c]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Real understanding cannot be a matter of mere symbol manipulation; computers cannot be conscious.<br /><br />John Searle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1529" x="-1620" y="1620" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Searle: Because mental state]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Because mental states are biological, they can cause and be caused by physical changes in human bodies.<br /><br />John Searle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1530" x="-1640" y="1640" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Searle: Language and other a]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Language and other artifacts have intentionally derived from the 'original/ intrinsic intentionality' of our conscious mental states.<br /><br />John Searle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1532" x="-1660" y="1660" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Searle: We-intentions (colle]]></label><detail><![CDATA[We-intentions (collective intentions) are held by individuals but they are not reducible to I-intentions.<br /><br />John Searle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1536" x="-1680" y="1680" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Searle: Many animals have pe]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Many animals have perceptual organs and behaviors similar to ours, so we find it irresistible to suppose that they have intentional states.<br /><br />John Searle]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1537" x="-1700" y="1700" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Fodor: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Jerry Fodor<br /><br />Jerry Fodor]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1540" x="-1720" y="1720" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Fodor: Brain states are lik]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Brain states are like computer states, capable of representation in virtue of causal connections with the world.<br /><br />Jerry Fodor]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1541" x="-1740" y="1740" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Fodor: Thought draws upon b]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Thought draws upon brain states which function as sentence-like representations -- a 'language of thought'.<br /><br />Jerry Fodor]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1542" x="-1760" y="1760" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Fodor: Linguistic form reco]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Linguistic form recognition can't be context-driven because context doesn't determine form; it must be carried out by largely encapsulated processes.<br /><br />Jerry Fodor]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1543" x="-1780" y="1780" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Fodor: Cognitive input syst]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Cognitive input systems (for perception and language) are modules: domain-specific computational systems with informational encapsulation.<br /><br />Jerry Fodor]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1546" x="-1800" y="1800" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Fodor: The brain's central ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The brain's central systems of belief fixation, thought, etc. must be isotropic and Quineian, thus domain-neutral unencapsulated, non-modulared<br /><br />Jerry Fodor]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1547" x="-1820" y="1820" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Fodor: It is only the modul]]></label><detail><![CDATA[It is only the modular cognitive systems that we have any hope of understanding; there is nothing to know about the central systems with universal connectivity.<br /><br />Jerry Fodor]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1548" x="-1840" y="1840" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Fodor: All cognitive psycho]]></label><detail><![CDATA[All cognitive psychologies thus far proposed, modular or not, imply epistemic boundedness (constraints on the beliefs that we can entertain).<br /><br />Jerry Fodor]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1549" x="-1860" y="1860" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Fodor: The complexity of ou]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The complexity of our minds is irrelevant to the question of whether they're the products of natural selection.<br /><br />Jerry Fodor]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1552" x="-1880" y="1880" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Nagel: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Thomas Nagel<br /><br />Thomas Nagel]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1554" x="-1900" y="1900" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Nagel: Objective knowledge ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Objective knowledge about an organism's behaviour and physiology does not allow us to form a conception of its subjective experience.<br /><br />Thomas Nagel]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1555" x="-1920" y="1920" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Nagel: Materialism is incom]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Materialism is incomplete even as a theory of the physical world, since the physical world includes conscious organisms.<br /><br />Thomas Nagel]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1557" x="-1940" y="1940" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Nagel: Consciousness, reaso]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Consciousness, reason, and value cannot be products of evolution: they might be among the basic aspects of the universe, guiding evolution.<br /><br />Thomas Nagel]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1582" x="-1960" y="1960" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Goldman: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Alvin Goldman<br /><br />Alvin Goldman]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1587" x="-1980" y="1980" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Goldman: In mental state attr]]></label><detail><![CDATA[In mental state attribution, one's own mental states are being used to stimulate the workings of the target mental state.<br /><br />Alvin Goldman]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1608" x="-2000" y="2000" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Jackson: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Frank Jackson<br /><br />Frank Jackson]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1609" x="-2020" y="2020" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Jackson: Even if you have all]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Even if you have all the physical knowledge about color vision, seeing colors ('qualia') gives you new information; physicalism is false.<br /><br />Frank Jackson]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1610" x="-2040" y="2040" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Jackson: To be in the phenome]]></label><detail><![CDATA[To be in the phenomenal state is to represent objective properties; a complete physicalist account for seeing colors is possible.<br /><br />Frank Jackson]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1611" x="-2060" y="2060" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Jackson: Using mental states ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Using mental states increases our ability to make successful predictions and explanations; mental states are functional properties.<br /><br />Frank Jackson]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1616" x="-2080" y="2080" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Lewis: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- David Lewis<br /><br />David Lewis]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1623" x="-2100" y="2100" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Lewis: Insofar as our menta]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Insofar as our mental states are causes of our physical actions, they too are physical, because physics is a 'closed' science.<br /><br />David Lewis]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1625" x="-2120" y="2120" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Lewis: Mental-physical stat]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Mental-physical state identities should be restricted to species or even particular organisms.<br /><br />David Lewis]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1626" x="-2140" y="2140" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Lewis: When you have all th]]></label><detail><![CDATA[When you have all the objective knowledge about color vision, seeing a new color is not new factual knowledge but a new skill.<br /><br />David Lewis]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1652" x="-2160" y="2160" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Parfit: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Derek Parfit<br /><br />Derek Parfit]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1653" x="-2180" y="2180" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Parfit: To be a person, a be]]></label><detail><![CDATA[To be a person, a being must be self-conscious, aware of its identity and its continued existence over time.<br /><br />Derek Parfit]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1654" x="-2200" y="2200" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Parfit: Persons are constitu]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Persons are constituted by, but not identical with, a physiology, a psychology, and the occurrence of a series of causal and cognitive relations.<br /><br />Derek Parfit]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1655" x="-2220" y="2220" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Parfit: Personal identity is]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Personal identity is not what matters in survival over time; what matters is psychological connectedness and/or continuity ('Relation R').<br /><br />Derek Parfit]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1656" x="-2240" y="2240" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Parfit: Since my much later ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Since my much later self would be more like a different person than me, how I treat him should fall under the rubric of morality, not self-interest.<br /><br />Derek Parfit]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1658" x="-2260" y="2260" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Parfit: My death only involv]]></label><detail><![CDATA[My death only involves that after a certain time, none of the thoughts and experiences that occur will be directly causally related to this brain.<br /><br />Derek Parfit]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1674" x="-2280" y="2280" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Daniel Dennett<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1679" x="-2300" y="2300" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: Comprehension is not]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Comprehension is not the source of competence; it is composed of competences, and it comes in degrees.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1680" x="-2320" y="2320" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: Our intentionality i]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Our intentionality is gradually derived from the intentionality of our "selfish genes", which is derived from the functional context of evolution.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1681" x="-2340" y="2340" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: With 'the intentiona]]></label><detail><![CDATA[With 'the intentional stance' we can treat something as an agent without committing to hypotheses about its internal structures.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1682" x="-2360" y="2360" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: Meaning and thoughts]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Meaning and thoughts do not show up within physics, but are apparent within 'the intentional stance' towards complex agents.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1683" x="-2380" y="2380" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: Minds are composed o]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Minds are composed of simpler subsystems that are composed of teams of still simpler agents so stupid that they can be replaced by a machine.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1684" x="-2400" y="2400" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: Attributions of ment]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Attributions of mental content are founded on an appreciation of the functional roles of the items in question in the biological (engineering) economy of the organism (robot).<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1685" x="-2420" y="2420" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: There is not a finis]]></label><detail><![CDATA[There is not a finish line or a center (a 'Cartesian theater') in the brain where the context is "presented" to the conscious subject.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1686" x="-2440" y="2440" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: A self is like a cen]]></label><detail><![CDATA[A self is like a center of (narrative) gravity: an abstract object, a theorist's useful fiction -- not a thing in a brain.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1687" x="-2460" y="2460" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: All mental activity ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[All mental activity is accomplished in the brain by parallel, competitive, multitrack processes of interpretation, under continuous editorial revisions.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1688" x="-2480" y="2480" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: Consciousness is a s]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Consciousness is a system of user-illusions evolved to make versions of our cognitive processes accessible to us for purposes of communication.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1689" x="-2500" y="2500" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: We can study conscio]]></label><detail><![CDATA[We can study consciousness objectively by getting the subjects' verbal accounts of their conscious experiences ('heterophenomenology').<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1690" x="-2520" y="2520" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: Free will (like colo]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Free will (like colors, dollars, promises) is part of the user-illusion of the manifest image that we shouldn't want to dismantle; it's where we live.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1691" x="-2540" y="2540" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: Qualia are in fact t]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Qualia are in fact the intentional objects of mistaken beliefs that simply don't exist, anywhere.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1692" x="-2560" y="2560" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: There might be varia]]></label><detail><![CDATA[There might be variations of consciousness from poet to possum to protozoon, and no 'essence' of consciousness to discover.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1693" x="-2580" y="2580" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: If the competence ob]]></label><detail><![CDATA[If the competence observed can be explained without appeal to comprehension, we must not indulge in extravagant anthropomorphism for animals.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1694" x="-2600" y="2600" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: Memes turned our bra]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Memes turned our brains into minds capable of dealing with ideas, thanks to the apps installed in our 'necktops'.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1695" x="-2620" y="2620" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: Brains are computers]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Brains are computers, but they are very unlike the computers in use today.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1696" x="-2640" y="2640" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: Unlike our computers]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Unlike our computers and flip-flops, organisms and neurons are competitive agents; this may be their key difference.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1697" x="-2660" y="2660" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: Brains are more like]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Brains are more like termite colonies than intelligently designed corporations or armies.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1698" x="-2680" y="2680" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: The traditional view]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The traditional view of free will, as a personal power isolated from physical causation, is both incoherent and unnecessary as a ground for morality.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1699" x="-2700" y="2700" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Dennett: Free will (like colo]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Free will (like colors, dollars, promises) is part of the user-illusion of the manifest image that we shouldn't want to dismantle; it's where we live.<br /><br />Daniel Dennett]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1700" x="-2720" y="2720" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Hofstadter: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Douglas Hofstadter<br /><br />Douglas Hofstadter]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1701" x="-2740" y="2740" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Hofstadter: A reductionist but i]]></label><detail><![CDATA[A reductionist but incomprehensible explanation of the brain exists; it needs 'soft' concepts like levels, mappings, and meanings in order to be comprehensible.<br /><br />Douglas Hofstadter]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1702" x="-2760" y="2760" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Hofstadter: Emergent phenomena l]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Emergent phenomena like the self and consciousness are 'Strange Loops' -- paradoxical feedback loops between the bottom and the top levels.<br /><br />Douglas Hofstadter]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1703" x="-2780" y="2780" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Hofstadter: Consciousness and in]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Consciousness and intelligence can be lifted right out of the hardware in which they reside; they are high-level, software properties.<br /><br />Douglas Hofstadter]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1704" x="-2800" y="2800" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Hofstadter: Intelligence arises ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Intelligence arises out of the composition of unintelligent neurons, just as 'intelligent' colony behaviour emerges from unintelligent ants.<br /><br />Douglas Hofstadter]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1705" x="-2820" y="2820" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Hofstadter: The 'I" is a tremend]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The 'I" is a tremendously effective, indispensable illusion, and falling for it has great survival value; it is the most precious thing we own.<br /><br />Douglas Hofstadter]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1706" x="-2840" y="2840" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Hofstadter: Each human head mirr]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Each human head mirrors, and thus houses, a large number of other "I"s -- other human beings at vastly differing levels of detail and fidelity.<br /><br />Douglas Hofstadter]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1707" x="-2860" y="2860" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Hofstadter: Although any individ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Although any individual's consciousness is primarily resident in one particular brain, it is also somewhat present in other brains as well.<br /><br />Douglas Hofstadter]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1708" x="-2880" y="2880" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Hofstadter: When the central bra]]></label><detail><![CDATA[When the central brain is destroyed, tiny fragments of the living individual remain alive in other brains, in personal notebooks, etc.<br /><br />Douglas Hofstadter]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1709" x="-2900" y="2900" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Hofstadter: Our decisions are ma]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Our decisions are made in the brain by an analogue to a voting process in a democracy as our desires chime in, constrained by external factors.<br /><br />Douglas Hofstadter]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1710" x="-2920" y="2920" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Hofstadter: Our will, quite the ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Our will, quite the opposite of being free, is steady and stable, like an inner gyroscope, and it is the stability of our non-free will that makes us who we are.<br /><br />Douglas Hofstadter]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1711" x="-2940" y="2940" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Churchland: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Paul and Patricia Churchland<br /><br />Paul and Patricia Churchland]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1712" x="-2960" y="2960" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Churchland: Common-sense psychol]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Common-sense psychology appears to be stagnant; there are many mental phenomena that folk psychology does not allow us to explain.<br /><br />Paul and Patricia Churchland]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1713" x="-2980" y="2980" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Churchland: Since folk theories ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Since folk theories (folk physics, folk biology, etc.) generally turn out to be mistaken, it seems quite impossible that folk psychology will turn out true.<br /><br />Paul and Patricia Churchland]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1714" x="-3000" y="3000" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Churchland: Introspection may be]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Introspection may be largely determined by our folk psychological framework; "introspecting" beliefs may be just like "seeing" demonic spirits or celestal spheres.<br /><br />Paul and Patricia Churchland]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1715" x="-3020" y="3020" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Churchland: As our neuroscientif]]></label><detail><![CDATA[As our neuroscientific understanding grows, we will come to see our current mental state concepts (beliefs, sensation, qualia, etc.) need to be discarded.<br /><br />Paul and Patricia Churchland]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1717" x="-3040" y="3040" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Churchland: Activity vectors are]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Activity vectors are the central kind of representations, and vector-to-vector transformations are the central kind of computations, in the brain.<br /><br />Paul and Patricia Churchland]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1718" x="-3060" y="3060" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Churchland: The more one learns ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The more one learns about the brain, the harder it becomes to imagine creatures with brain processes like ours but lacking consciousness.<br /><br />Paul and Patricia Churchland]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1768" x="-3080" y="3080" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Clark: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Andy Clark<br /><br />Andy Clark]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1769" x="-3100" y="3100" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Clark: The work of controll]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The work of controlling behaviour is not done in the head but involves interactions and feedback between brain and body.<br /><br />Andy Clark]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1770" x="-3120" y="3120" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Clark: If an external objec]]></label><detail><![CDATA[If an external object performs a function that we'd regard as mental if it were performed by our brain, then that object is a part of your mind.<br /><br />Andy Clark]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1771" x="-3140" y="3140" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Clark: We construct 'cognit]]></label><detail><![CDATA[We construct 'cognitive niches' -- external environments that serve to guide and structure our activities.<br /><br />Andy Clark]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1772" x="-3160" y="3160" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Clark: Conscious experience]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Conscious experience flows from 'generative entanglements' that mix predictions about the world, the body, and our own reactive dispositions.<br /><br />Andy Clark]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1773" x="-3180" y="3180" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chalmers: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- David Chalmers<br /><br />David Chalmers]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1774" x="-3200" y="3200" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chalmers: The tasks of explain]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The tasks of explaining the performance of the cognitive functions (perception, attention, memory, etc.) are easy problems.<br /><br />David Chalmers]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1775" x="-3220" y="3220" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chalmers: The task of explaini]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The task of explaining why the performance of cognitive functions are accompanied by experience is the unique, hard problem of consciousness.<br /><br />David Chalmers]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1776" x="-3240" y="3240" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chalmers: Even when we have so]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Even when we have solved all the easy problems of cognitive functions, the hard problem of consciousness may still remain unresolved.<br /><br />David Chalmers]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1777" x="-3260" y="3260" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chalmers: The reason that redu]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The reason that reductive explanation fails for consciousness is that it cannot be functionally analyzed.<br /><br />David Chalmers]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1778" x="-3280" y="3280" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chalmers: 'Zombies' (creatures]]></label><detail><![CDATA['Zombies' (creatures physically and functionally identical to us, but lacking consciousness) are conceivable.<br /><br />David Chalmers]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1781" x="-3300" y="3300" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chalmers: The conceivability o]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The conceivability of 'zombies' (and spectrum inversion) and the "knowledge argument" demonstrate that consciousness cannot be functionally analyzed.<br /><br />David Chalmers]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1782" x="-3320" y="3320" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chalmers: We may have to take ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[We may have to take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time.<br /><br />David Chalmers]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1783" x="-3340" y="3340" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chalmers: We need to discover ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[We need to discover the psychological principles that connect the properties of physical processes to the properties of experience.<br /><br />David Chalmers]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1784" x="-3360" y="3360" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chalmers: Information may be f]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Information may be fundamental for experience, with its two aspects corresponding to the physical and the phenomenal features of the world.<br /><br />David Chalmers]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1785" x="-3380" y="3380" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chalmers: Even a thermostat mi]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Even a thermostat might have maximally simple phenomenal experience as a maximally simple information-processing structure.<br /><br />David Chalmers]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1786" x="-3400" y="3400" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chalmers: Fundamental entities]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Fundamental entities bearing micro(proto)phenomenal properties may be constituting the macrophenomenal realm.<br /><br />David Chalmers]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="1787" x="-3420" y="3420" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Chalmers: If an external objec]]></label><detail><![CDATA[If an external object performs a function that we'd regard as mental if it were performed by your brain, the that object is a part of your mind.<br /><br />David Chalmers]]></detail></topic>
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<topic ID="181" x="-20" y="20" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ockham: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- William of Ockham<br /><br />William of Ockham]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="187" x="-40" y="40" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Ockham: Concepts are not men]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Concepts are not mental objects ("ficta") resembling objects in the world like pictures, but mental actions caused by the objects.<br /><br />William of Ockham]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="334" x="-60" y="60" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Hume: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- David Hume<br /><br />David Hume]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="337" x="-80" y="80" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Hume: When I enter into wh]]></label><detail><![CDATA[When I enter into what I call 'myself', I always stumble on some particular perception/sensation; the self is nothing but a bundle of perceptions.<br /><br />David Hume]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="519" x="-100" y="100" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Mill: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- John Stuart Mill<br /><br />John Stuart Mill]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="540" x="-120" y="120" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Mill: The sensation of col]]></label><detail><![CDATA[The sensation of color cannot be explained by any law of motion (of the particles in the body) even though there is a correlation between the two.<br /><br />John Stuart Mill]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="587" x="-140" y="140" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[James: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- William James<br /><br />William James]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="592" x="-160" y="160" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[James: All thought is const]]></label><detail><![CDATA[All thought is constantly in flux and never static; nevertheless, there is an ongoing continuity of thought for every thinker ('stream of consciousness').<br /><br />William James]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="593" x="-180" y="180" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[James: New ideas are produc]]></label><detail><![CDATA[New ideas are produced as accidental variations in the instable human brain and then selected by the person's consciousness and the social environment.<br /><br />William James]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="599" x="-200" y="200" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Brentano: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Franz Brentano<br /><br />Franz Brentano]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="600" x="-220" y="220" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Brentano: Every mental process]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Every mental process is directed towards itself as a secondary object; inner perception makes us become aware of our own mental phenomena.<br /><br />Franz Brentano]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="601" x="-240" y="240" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Brentano: There cannot be unco]]></label><detail><![CDATA[There cannot be unconscious mental phenomena, but only conscious mental phenomena of very low intensity.<br /><br />Franz Brentano]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="602" x="-260" y="260" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Brentano: Consciousness always]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Consciousness always forms a unity: we can only perceive one mental phenomenon at a specific point in time.<br /><br />Franz Brentano]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="603" x="-280" y="280" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Brentano: Inner observation is]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Inner observation is impossible because it requires us to have two distinct acts in the same moment, but it is impossible to remember past mental acts.<br /><br />Franz Brentano]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="604" x="-300" y="300" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Brentano: Every mental phenome]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Every mental phenomenon is characterized by the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and reference to a content, direction toward an object.<br /><br />Franz Brentano]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="605" x="-320" y="320" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Brentano: Intentionality is an]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Intentionality is an irreducible feature of mental phenomena, no physical phenomena can exhibit it; mental phenomena cannot be a species of physical phenomena.<br /><br />Franz Brentano]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="606" x="-340" y="340" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Brentano: There are three basi]]></label><detail><![CDATA[There are three basic kinds of mental phenomena: presentations, judgements, and emotions.<br /><br />Franz Brentano]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="638" x="-360" y="360" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Frege: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Gottlob Frege<br /><br />Gottlob Frege]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="652" x="-380" y="380" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Frege: Do I see the same co]]></label><detail><![CDATA[Do I see the same colors as you do? is an unanswerable, nonsensical question; color terms characterize sense-impressions belonging to one's consciousness.<br /><br />Gottlob Frege]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="653" x="-400" y="400" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Freud: ]]></label><detail><![CDATA[- Sigmund Freud<br /><br />Sigmund Freud]]></detail></topic>
<topic ID="654" x="-420" y="420" color="#ccdddd"><label><![CDATA[Freud: There is a dynamic u]]></label><detail><![CDATA[There is a dynamic unconscious part of the mind which exerts pressures and influences on what we do and say.<br /><br />Sigmund Freud]]></detail></topic>
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